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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIX

APRIL, I934

NUMBER 3

SUMMARY JUDICIAL POWER
JAY LEO ROTHSCHILDt

(This article was written before the decision in Bank of United
States v. Manheim, handed down by the Court of Appeals on Mar.
6, 1934, and which, in its expression of principle, is in accord with
the conclusions stated herein. Comment on the case will be
found at page 387, which was added to the article after it was
written.)
The inundation of our courts by the tide of litigation has brought
about fundamental changes in our conceptions of justice. With the
best of intentions, but, nevertheless, in desperation, we have shifted
the very foundation of time-honored rights, and converted them into
mere privileges. A "day in courte' is thus fast being converted from a
right assumed, to a privilege to be granted only for good reason
shown. It is the goal reserved only for those who overcome every
obstacle placed in their way. It is no longer the inalienable right
guaranteed by constitution and protected for every litigant. Relinquishment by waiver is not only tolerated, but encouraged.' Even
what suggests arbitration, with all its informality and disregard of
judicial procedure, is sanctioned by court rules.2 The line between
mere private right and public interest is shadowy indeed, and simple
is it for the unwary to tumble from the protecting embrace of public
policy into the morass of mere private concern and entanglement.
tMember of New York and New Jersey Bars.
'Matter of Petition of N. Y., L. & W. Ry., 98 N. Y. 447, 452 (1885); but see
People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. III (1928), 6I

A.2 L. R. 793

(1929).

SUBDIVISION F, RULE 14, TRIAL TERm RULES, KINGS COUNTY:

"The Justice assigned to Special Term, Part 2, shall on each Monday,
Wednesday and Friday, between Ir A. M. and I P. M., hear such matters as
may be brought before him under the provisions of this subdivision, which
matters shall be known as 'Informal Motions'. In any action or proceeding
in the Second Judicial District in which the attorneys for all parties who
have appeared shall appear voluntarily before such Justice for the purpose of
obtaining a ruling or decision, such Justice sitting as the court shall hear the
parties informally, without presentation of affidavits, motion papers or proof,
and make a ruling or decision thereon, which, if desired by either party, may
be embodied in a court order or judgment to be signed and entered."
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There is an impatience in judicial conduct and procedure, and an intolerance of circumspection in any form-even when guaranteed by
constitutions-which have resulted in scuttling the lessons of generations, and in the usurpation of the functions of juries-in an attitude
symptomatic of an era in which governments on "vertical" lines,
"totalitarian" states, and "new deals" are the rule of the day. Efficiency, by and large, rather than exact justice in each case, is the new
standard. The entire judicial machinery-at least, in the larger
cities-seems to be geared up to clear our calendars. Like in commercial activity, accomplishment is measured by volume of turnover
and dispatch of so many cases. The purpose is praiseworthy, but the
result is not judicial. For the grist of the mill cannot be judged by
the samples which pass through the appellate courts. For most
litigants, the court of last resort is the court of original jurisdiction.
It is as if the centrifugal force developed in the ever-increasing whirl
of the judicial wheel, is throwing out to the periphery and forever
away, all those who cannot hold fast. It seems to be forgotten that
the judicial system is made up not merely of judges and courts, but
also of lawyers, and that the efforts of all are futile, if the litigants
who furnish the causes in litigation are not satisfied that they have
had the benefit of deliberate consideration by a court, which has
heard them and their witnesses, and not merely read the affidavits
prepared by their attorneys. A "day in court" has a literal significance which is the- guarantee against loss of confidence in the
judicial process.
Our problem arises because, as in all other fields, this ideal conception of a "day in court" has run afoul of conditions never anticipated. The mere volume of litigation has swamped the judicial ship,
and we must be careful, lest the very basis of our conception of
justice does not go down with it. Granted that justice delayed is a
denial of justice itself, yet it has been overlooked that justice unduly
expedited, so that it becomes administrative rather than judicial, is
no longer respected. Experienced judges and lawyers know only too
well that trial by affidavit depends largely on the skill of the affidavit
draftsman, whose skill is exhibited as much by what he suppresses as
by what he discloses, and that disposition -of issues of credibility,
though labelled as questions of law, are, nevertheless, decisions of
questions of fact. A judicial proceeding inevitably contemplates
something of the solemnity and deliberation of judgment, involving
an appraisal of witnesses, after an opportunity to be heard. The
delay thus inherent has proved to be part of the price of liberty itself.
We do not say that improvements should not be made, if they are
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consistent with these principles. But there should be sharp discrimination between those methods which impose burdens on litigants and undermine fundamental conceptions, so that a "day in
court" may be avoided, and those which merely weed out litigations
in which there is no issue to be tried.
Devices to stem the tide, of the former class, have been many.
More judges were elected. Arbitrary increases in the cost of putting
cases on the jury calendars were imposed. 3 Jury trial became an
institution no longer easily available to those without means. It was
made comparatively simple to omit some technical step essential to
preserve the right to jury trial, and thus bring about an automatic
waiver, where none was intended.4 Those who insisted upon jury
trials, nevertheless, particularly in the lower courts, were accused of
bad faith in thus employing a constitutional right to delay the day of
justice.
But it is not of these that we shall here treat, but rather of devices
whose purpose is right, if only their function be not diverted. We
refer to the motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary
judgment, under Rules I12, 113 and 114; dismissals at the trial under
Civil Practice Act Section 482, and directions of verdicts under Civil
Practice Act Section 4 5 7 -A.
The praiseworthy function of the rule for summary judgment is
now well recognized. The true scope of Civil Practice Act Section
482 is now understood. Their history is now important only as it
sheds light upon the origin and function of related clauses in our
procedure, conceived in the same purpose of expediting the demise of
litigations which present no issue worthy of resolution by trial.
Therefore, we refer to the motions for judgment, in whatever form,
only insofar as their development may serve as a guide in giving
scope to the third innovation of directing verdicts where they might
be set aside, under Section 4 5 7-A, which provision, strangely enough,
has not been satisfactorily interpreted, even at this time. Our
purpose will be to establish that, in the light of surrounding circumstances, Section 4 5 7-A should be limited to cases in which there is no
issue of fact requiring resolution by a jury, and should not be extended to permit judges to usurp the functions of juries. Remedies
born of the same function and purpose should: be construed and
applied by the same standard.
We seek to find the "internal sense" of the statute.
"The same idea of the rule of constructing a statute, is very
quaintly expressed by Plowden in his commentary upon the
3

N. Y. CIVL PRAc. AcT §1557-A.

4

N. Y. CIVIL PRAc. AcT

§426.
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case of Eyston v. Studd (2 Plowd. 465). He says, 'it is not the
words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law,
and our law, (like all others) consists of two parts, viz., of body
and soul; the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the
sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, "quia ratio
legis est anima legis". And the law may be resembled to a nut,
which has a shell and a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of it the kernel; and as you will be
no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so you
will receive no benefit from the law if you rely upon the letter,
and as the fruit and profit of the nut lies in the kernel, and not
in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense
more than in the letter. And it often happens, that when you
know the letter, you know not the sense, for sometimes the
sense is more confined and contracted than the letter, and
sometimes it is more large and extensive." This authority, it
seems to me, is peculiarly applicable to a case where books of
science and the literary lexicons are cited to prove the definitions and meaning of words, or in the language of Plowden, to
prove what is the body, rather than what is the reason and intent
of the statute.""
The remedy of summary judgment came in with the Civil Practice
Act in 1922. It was said that litigants had no vested right in the
delays of litigation, and, accordingly, a procedural rule was formulated, by which discrimination might be made between real issues,
deserving trial, and feigned issues, which merely delayed the entry of,
judgment. Of all the innovations of the Civil Practice Act, this was
the most effective, because the soundest, and it has developed its
efficiency, for the purpose of reducing dishonest litigation, to an
extent quite appreciable and in strict accordance with fundamental
conceptions of justice.5 True, in the beginning, there was much
hesitation as to whether the -remedy was constitutional. So much
was its validity feared, that it was not placed in the Civil Practice
Act, but among the Rules, where it might be defended as a procedural regulation, rather than as a change in substance. Past decisions of our courts, particularly of the Court of Appeals, gave warning to be very cautious, 6 but the fear was quite groundless, because
4aHolmes v. Carley, 31 N. Y. 289, 290 (1865), quoting from Plowden.
5
Leonard S. Saxe, Summary Judgmentsin New York-A StatisticalStudy (1934)
i9 CORNELL LAw QUARTERLY 237; Extension of the Right of Summary Judgment,
by Edward R. Finch, presiding justice of the Appellate Division of the First
Department, N. Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, May 1932; REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEw YORK STATE,
LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT (1934) No. 50, pp. 40ff.

For early history of experience under RULE 113, see by the author: Simplift(1923) 23 COL. L. Rv. 618, 732, (1924) 24
COL. L. REv. 732, 865, (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 30; New York Civil PracticeSimpli-

cation of Civil Practice in New York
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the practical situation demanded a solution, and, in the light of the
need, a reason to sustain the innovation was found without difficulty.
True, also, that, in the beginning, there was much confusion as to
the proper application of the rule, as well as uncertainty as to its
relation to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, under Rule 12.
7
Was the motion for summary judgment merely a plaintiff's remedy?
Could it dispose of a counterclaim as well as of mere denials of defenses?$ Was it to be identified with a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or differentiated by reason of the fact that affidavits could
be used?' Was its efficacy to be confined within the limits of the
issues formed by the pleadings, or would the court go into the merits
on the assumption that the pleadings would be later amended to constitute a sufficient vehicle for the issues thus discerned? I 0 Could the
court impose conditions in granting summary judgment?" Was there
a real distinction between summary judgment under Rule 113 and
partial judgment under Rule 114? Was it the only method of disposing of a case in which there were no real issues to be tried, after
issue was joined, or could Rules 1o4-relating to sham pleadingsand I12-treating of motions for judgment on the pleadings-be
availed of, notwithstanding that time had elapsed for motions ad12
dressed to the complaint and motions addressed to the answer?
These problems were all solved by the desire to terminate unworthy litigations, though at very serious sacrifice of symmetry in the
Civil Practice Act and Rules. Though there was an elaborate mechanism for motions addressed to the pleadings, which had to be made
within twenty days and ten days, and thotugh it is inconceivable
what could have been in the minds of the framers of the new Civil
Practice Act, if they intended that anything which had to be done
within twenty days and ten days, could, nevertheless, be done withfled (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 30, (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 258, 413; cf. Lehman, J.,
in Rogan v. Consolidated Copper Mines Co., 117 Misc. 718, 193 N. Y. Supp.

163 (1922); Mullan, J., in Hanna v. Mitchell, N. Y. L. J., March 3, 1922.
7
N. Y. CIVIL PRAC. Ru1LE 113, as originally formulated.
"Chelsea Exchange Bank v. Munoz, 202 App. Div. 702, 195 N. Y. Supp. 484
(ist Dept. 1922); Goodman & Suss, Inc., v. Wallack, 195 N. Y. Supp. 328 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).

'General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E.
216 (1923); Dwan v. Massarene, I99 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1st
Dept. 1922).
"0Curry v. MacKenzie, 239 N. Y. 267, 146 N. E. 375 (1925).

"Gibson v. Standard Auto Mutual Gas. Co., 2o8 App. Div. 93, 2o3 N. Y. Supp.
53 (ist Dept. 1924).

'2Cf. Wayland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281 (1871); Dahlstrom v. Gemunder, 198

N. Y. 449, 92 N. E. lO6 (191o); Kirschbaum v. Erschmann, 2o5 N. Y. 127, 98
N. E. 328 (1912); Rochkind v. Perlman, 123 App. Div. 808 (2nd Dept. 19o8);
Baum's Castorine Co. v. Thomas, 92 Hun I, 37 N. Y. Supp. 9x3 (1895).
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out time limit, Rule 112 was finally construed so that any motion
addressed to the sufficiency of the pleadings could be made at any
time, notwithstanding the meticulous delimitation of authority as to
particular types of motions."
Similarly, as to Rule I13, solution was found by the same process.
The old rule that pleadings could be struck out as sham-now reflected in Civil Practice Rule io4--which, properly construed, was,
in effect, a motion for summary judgment, available in any case, was
conveniently forgotten, lest some constitutional protection for right
to jury trial might invalidate the limited operation possible under
Rule 113 .14 So, it was said that one could move for summary judgment in a case involving liquidated damages and on a contract, but
not in a case to foreclose a mortgage.'5 Yet, surely, an answer which
was false in a foreclosure action was just as much sham under Rule
104, as an answer which was false in an action for breach of contract
under Rule 113. And a rule which had been settled for many years,
even under the old Code of Civil Procedure-that affidavits might
be considered on a motion to strike out as sham, under Rule io416was overruled by decisions of the Appellate Divisions, which said
that, in foreclosure actions, no affidavits might be considered on such
a motion.' 7 The result was that Rule 113, which was intended to be a
cautious extension of a principle already recognized, that affidavits
might be employed to ascertain whether there was an issue to be
tried, was interpreted so that it foreclosed the conduct of such an inquiry, by a means which had always been recognized.
However, this relapse was corrected by amendments of Rule 113,
so that it included most actions-even foreclosure actions-and
became available generally, and, thus, what had been an erroneous
interpretation of existing law, was corrected through the rule-making
power.' 8 And, later, this remedy was extended so as to become
available to defendants as well as to plaintiffs, 19 and the entire spirit
"3Cf. Hubbs & Company v. Richard, 119 Misc. 436, 197 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1922);
N. Y. CIVIL PRAc. RULES io6, io9, III; Stage v. Michigan Central R. R. Co.,
I99 App. Div. 675, 191 N. Y. Supp. 824 (4 th Dept. 1922); Klippel v. Weil, 204
App.
Div. 323, 198 N. Y. Supp. 13 (Ist Dept. 1923).
24Cf. authorities supra note 12.
IbToner v. Ehrgott, 226 App. Div. 244, 235 N. Y. Supp. i7 (rst Dept. 1929).
IsCf. supranote 12.
1
7Monica Realty Corp. v. Bleecker, 229 App. Div. 184, 241 N. Y. Supp. 290
(Ist Dept. 1930); Lowe v. Plainfield Trust Company, 216 App. Div. 72, 215
N. Y. Supp. 50 (ist Dept. 1926); Levan v. American Safety Table Co., 222 App.
Div. 110, 225 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dept. 1927); Reed v. Neu-Pro Construction
Corp., 226 App. Div. 70, 234 N. Y. Supp. 400 (Ist Dept. 1929).
"gAmendment adopted.
'$Amendment adopted.
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of the procedural change enlarged, so as not merely to prevent delay
in the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff, but to clear the calendam of cases where the plaintiff had no right to prosecute a litigation.
The result was desirable, although, as to defendants, of very little
practical consequence, in view of the fact that other and existing
rules were merely duplicated,2 0 and that, in any event, the remedy is
peculiarly a plaintiff's.
But, again, the symmetry of the Civil Practice Act and Rules was
marred, for the original purpose of the framers of the Act and Rules
was, undoubtedly, to require a defendant who would thus avoid a
trial by an anticipatory test of the merits of a cause, to proceed in accordance with Rules 107 and iio. It will be remembered that these
rules permitted defendants, within specified time limitations, to
move to dismiss the pleadings upon affidavits, establishing particular
defenses to the plaintiff's cause of action. But these rules would
now seem to have little purpose, if any, in view of the extension of
Rule 113 as a defendant's remedy, as well, so that a defendant may
now move, upon any ground which would be available to him on the
trial, and upon affidavits, to dismiss the complaint.
The net result, therefore, is that, in the interests of simplicity and
clarity, we might just as well repeal all of our motion practice, other
than as contained in Rules 112 and 113. For to what purpose is it
to build up an elaborate scheme of motions, with restricted time
limitations, when everything which may be accomplished under that
scheme is available, at any time, without limitations, within the
broad scope of Rules 112 and 113?
But our purpose in thus exposing this process, is not to dwell upon
the mere procedural inadvisability of pyramiding complications,
when simple rules are available for the same purpose, but, rather, to
show that logic is the last thing in the world which may be relied
upon for a proper analysis of procedural development. There is little
logic in the entire process of code-making. Necessity or expediency
makes the rules. Logic presents them and makes them plausible.
When the need expires, the rule becomes illogical. Our present
practice, enlarging the scope of summary judicial power, is the result
of a steadfast purpose to clear the calendars, by one device or another, without too tender a regard for the symmetry of a procedural
system, built up so that a logical order and sequence might follow.
If immediate trials were possible, we might well scrap much of the
Civil Practice Act, but, since they are not, we must have rules to
eliminate, as much as we can, such litigations which have only delay
20

N. Y. CiviL PRAc.

RULES

107 and iio.
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as their purpose. But, if we are to have a practice which will function, it must be easily grasped, not only by ourselves, but also by
those whom the future will call to the profession, and who, like ourselves, will be impatient with the lessons of history. Therefore it is
that we should eliminate outworn rules and redundant formulations
of regulation and principle. For, as the years pass on, the result is
always confusion, then impatience, and, finally, disregard of the very
fundamentals of judicial process.
Now, tracing the development of our practice as to motions to
dismiss the complaint, made during a trial, reflected in Section 482
of the Civil Practice Act, we find a similar process. It was an old
theory, supported by the logic of a more leisurely day, that a dismissal of the complaint, at any stage of the trial, short of that point
where the party had rested his case, could not be on the merits, but
must operate, at the most, as a non-suit, without prejudice.2' Much
significance attached to the difference between a motion to dismiss a
complaint and a directed verdict. That conception, at least, in
terms, was abolished when Civil Practice Act Section 482 was
adopted, for it provided a rule of thumb by which the conclusiveness
of the adjudication depended, not on the inquiry as to whether the
party had rested his proof, but upon the stage of the case which had
been reached, and the form which the dismissal took.22 So, if the
court dismissed the complaint before the close of the plaintiff's case,
the presumption was that the dismissal was not on the merits, although it might be, if the court so directed. And, if the dismissal
took place at,the close of the plaintiff's case or at any later stage, the
presumption was that it was on the merits, though it need not be. In
order to ascertain just what had occurred and what conclusiveness
should attach to the adjudication, it was only necessary to look to the
judgment. It was no longer necessary to examine into the record.23
This was the conclusion after much doubt as to what was the rule,
and reluctance to follow a clear and unambiguous statute. Witness
the early decision of the Appellate Division of the Fourth Depart21Caruso v. Metropolitan 5-50 Cent Store,
199
22 (3rd Dept.

214

App. Div. 328, 212 N. Y. Supp.

1925).

This seems to be clear, notwithstanding the discussion in the case in the preceding note. Cf. Hollenbeck v. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 215 App. Div.
6o9, 24 N. Y. Supp. 402 (3rd Dept. 1926), aff'd in 243 N. Y. 540 (1926).
2

Authorities in note supra;also Luce v. N. Y. C. & St. L. C.,

223

App. Div.

374 2ri N.Y. Supp. 184 (4th Dept. 2925); Tanner v. Tennenbaum, 235 App. Div.
173, 256 N. Y. Supp. 562 (ist Dept. 1932); Henderson Tire Co. v. Wilson, 203

App. Div. 658, 196 N. Y. Supp. 879 (4th Dept.
139 N. E. 583

(1923).

1922),

modified

235

N. Y. 489,
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ment, in which it was said that there could be no such thing as a dismissal on the merits, without a meritorious adjudication in the form
of findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the one hand, or the
verdict of a jury, on the other.24
The third procedural device, incorporated in Section 4 5 7-A of the
Civil Practice Act, undoubtedly, was a part of the same general
policy, i. e., of limiting the right to trial, in the normal sense, only,to
those cases where there was an issue to be tried. Singularly, however, its scope has not as yet been clearly defined in judicial decision3.a Its function is to be determined in the light of the policy
indicated by the provisions of which we have already treated-for it is
the mischief to be remedied which furnishes the standard for proper
25
interpretation of any new statute.
The statute provides:
"457-a. Directionof a verdict. The judge may direct a verdict
when he would set aside a contrary verdict as against the weight
of the evidence."
There are those who think it unconstitutional, because it permits a
judge to usurp the function of a jury." For, while a judge might set
aside a verdict as against the weight of evidence, and order a new
trial, that would be quite different from directing a verdict and thus
ending the litigation. On the other hand, there are those who are of
the opinion that the issue is not of validity, but of construction, and
that the authority to a judge to direct a verdict, where he would set
aside a contrary verdict as against the weight of the evidence, is not
so broad a grant of power that it includes the power to direct a verdict
where the trial justice disagrees with the jury. To them, it seems
that a trial justice may direct a verdict, under such circumstances,
only where there is a defect of proof, as distinguished from dissatisfaction with the quality of the proof or the conduct of the trial; that
the grant of power is not an authorization to use it indiscriminately,
but only in such a proper case.
But, whatever may be the proper construction, it is quite plain
that what the Legislature did was to incorporate in a legislative
code of practice, a phraseology not at all novel, but importing a
principle which had often been stated in judicial opinion, in the
courts of many states, as well as in the federal courts. Accordingly,
there is a third approach possible, namely, that what was enacted was
24

Caruso case, supra note 21.
21aAs pointed out in the caption, the question has now been definitely determined.
25
American Historical Society v. Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 162 N. E. 481 (1928).
2
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1928) p. 140.
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merely the statutory declaration of a principle already recognized.
So, if we examine Section 459 of the Civil Practice Act, with its
counterpart in Sections 1187 and 1188 of the Code of Civil Procedure-which was the only statutory provision on the subject prior
to the adoption of Section 4 57-A-it will be rather startling, but,
nevertheless, informative, to observe that nowhere in our civil procedure codes was the proposition ever stated as to the power of a
court to direct a verdict. Yet, the power was continually exercised
on well-settled principles.
That a statute should declare a rule, rather than make a new one,
is nothing novel in procedural codes. So, in Siebert v. Dunn,27 this
principle was recognized by the Court of Appeals, in its construction
of Section 266 of the Civil Practice Act, relating to counterclaims,
and the rule stated that the Civil Practice Act "should not be given
an interpretation depriving the defendant of a recoupment which, as
stated, the common law would have sanctioned, unless they under
such construction, compel it". Similarly, this principle was recognized in People v. Miller,2 in which the Code of Criminal Procedure
was construed so as not to abrogate fundamental common law principles, and in which the Appellate Division said, as to such provisions:
"Being merely declaratory of the common law, these statutes are to
be construed as near to the rule and reason of common law as may
be * * * and we are not to limit or lessen their application where for
convenience of codification, the rule has been stated in two sections
instead of one". Certainly, the purpose of simplification, sought to
be accomplished by the revision of our practice, in 192o, was not envisaged as an uprooting and upheaval of all known standards, but,
rather as a re-statement of fundamentals, which would more clearly
emerge after the elimination of merely procedural embarrassments.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that a known
phrase, incorporated therein, shall be interpreted with reference to
prior law,29 and that fundamental changes will not be lightly implied.30 Particularly is this so as to a statutory revision,3 as to
which the rule is that all parts of the statute must be read as a unit
and in iarmony.32
Since we start, therefore, with the basic thought that Section 457-A
"Siebert v. Dunn, 216 N. Y. 237, 1o N. E. 447 (I915).
28

People v. Miller, 143 App. Div. 251 (Ist Dept. 1911); aff'd 202 N. Y. 618, 96
1125 (1911).
0'Rourke v. People, 3 Hun 225 (3rd Dept. 1874).
3°See cases cited §184 statutes, MCICINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS oF NEw YORK,
3
Vol. I, p. 256.
Davisv. Davis, 75 N.Y. 221 (1878).
32

N.29R.

Matthews v. Matthews, 240 N. Y. 28, 147 N. E. 237 (1925).
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was born of the same purpose as Civil Practice Rule 113 and Civil
Practice Act Section 482-the first introducing the power to dispose
of a controversy without trial, where there is no issue to be tried, and
the second attributing to the dismissal of a complaint the finality of
an adjudication on the merits, in the absence of express provision
to the contrary-we should interpret all by the same standard, i. e., is
there an issue to be tried? No one would venture the thought that
Rule i13 permitted a judge, in the exercise of his discretion, to dispose of a case on the weight of the evidence, or that Civil Practice
Act Section 482 justified a court in dismissing a complaint on the
merits, where it was plain that, upon a new trial, further proof might
be adduced. 33 The purpose of all of these provisions was to end litigation where there was no issue to be tried. The purpose of all of
them would be frustrated and injustice perpetrated, if they were construed so as to permit a judge to determine that which has traditionally been within the exclusive function of a jury. By these standards,
Civil Practice Act Section 4 5 7-A does no more than formulate, so
that all who read may understand, fundamental principles underlying control of jury trials, protected by constitutional guarantees
and by the experience of generations. Any other rule would substitute the judge for the jury, in the delicate task of weighing evidence. In many cases, it would deprive litigants of the substance of
the right to appeal, even though the form might still be granted
them. For, if a judge, merely by reason of the fact that a single
witness testified to an occurrence, were able to direct a verdict where
he would set aside a contrary verdict as against the weight of evidence, what would there be left of the rule that, even if testimony is
uncontradicted, yet, if it be given by interested witnesses, there is an
issue of fact which must be submitted to the jury ?34
Such meager historical background of an extra-judicial character,
as there is, shows that there was no purpose but to formulate a rule
representing the law as it had been theretofore interpreted. From
the Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simplification of the Civil Practice of New York (Vol. i; igis) we take the
following:
Section 37 of the proposed act:
"A verdict may be directed upon the trial where a contrary
verdict would be clearly against the weight of the evidence".
(p.

22)

33

As to summary judgment, cf. General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T.
Co., supra note 9; as to N. Y. CIVIL PRAc. ACT §482, cf. Hollenbeck v. Aetna,
supranote 22; Caruso v. Metropolitan 5-5o Cent Stores, supra note 21.
3
'Kavanagh v. Wilson, 7o N. Y. 177 (1877); Hull v. Littauer, 162 N. Y. 569,

57 N. E.

102 (1900).
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which, it will be observed, differs from our present statute only in the
presence of the additional word "clearly". What was thus intended
appears from the following discussion:
"(Sec. 37) The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York recommended the following:
'Upon a trial by jury, wherever the evidence adduced by any
party is insufficient in law to sustain a verdict; or is insufficient
reasonably to satisfy a jury that the facts. sought to be proved
are established; or is in such contradiction to matters of common
knowledge or the laws of nature as to be wholly or in essential
parts incredible as a matter of law; or is otherwise wholly or in
essential parts incredible as a matter of law; the trial justice
shall direct such verdict as would be proper had such party adduced no evidence.'
The purpose of the proposed amendment, as stated in the
memorandum of the special committee of the association, is to
state clearly the rule as to the power of a trial judge to take a
case from a jury even though there be a scintilla of evidence and
to reaffirm the rule laid down in numerous cases, that a judge
may direct a verdict where a contrary verdict would be clearly
against the weight of evidence by putting into statutory form
the law as declared in the McDonald and Fealey cases. (McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N. Y. 66; Fealey v. Bull, 163
N. Y. 397; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73; Hemmens v. Nelson,
138 N. Y. 517; Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417; Bulger v.

Rosa, iIg N. Y. 459; Dwight v. Germania Life Ins. Co., io3
N.Y. 341; Tabar v. Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547)." (P. 210)
This becomes increasingly significant when we appreciate that an
earlier New York City Bar Association "Report of the Committee
Appointed to Consider the Simplification of the New York Procedure" of November i,igog-six years earlier-contained the following recommendation:
"Trials:
VIII. Upon a trial by jury, where the evidence is so preponderating in favor of one side, that a verdict contrary to it
would be set aside as against the evidence, it should be the duty
of the trial justice to direct a verdict. Where there is no evidence to support an issue, the complaint should be dismissed
(Recommendation io).
Until the decision of the McDonald case (167 N. Y. 66), The
Court of Appeals applied the rule that a verdict can be directed
as above stated. In the McDonald case, that court disregarded
its own repeated decisions and held that in such a case the trial
judge could not direct a verdict, but could only set aside an
erroneous verdict. (Bulger v. Rosa, ii9 N. Y. 459, 464; Linkauf
v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 418, 425-6; Hemmens v. Nelson, 138
N. Y. 57, 529-530; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 96-7). The
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Legislature should be asked to settle this conflict by restoring
the ancient rule". (p. 4)
This was crystallized in:
"Recommendation ioResolved that the Code of Civil Procedure should be amended
by adding a new section to be known as Section i 8 5 -A, to read
as follows:
Section i185-A. Direction of a verdict. Upon a trial by jury,
where there is no evidence upon an issue before the jury, it is
the duty of the trial justice to dismiss the complaint or counterclaim as to that issue; where the weight of evidence is so preponderating in favor of one side, that a verdict contrary to it
would be set aside as against the evidence, it is the duty of the
trial justice to direct a verdict as the case may require." (p. io)
But, as we have seen, this recommendation was dropped in the report
made six years later, and, certainly, was not incorporated in the
report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation, which immediately
preceded the enactment of the Civil Practice Act.
Turning from these extrajudicial sources of information, unfortunately we find little guidance to our inquiry, in decisions of our
courts. Thus far, though the question of the proper construction of
Section 4 5 7-A, has been submitted to the Court of Appeals on several
occasions, that court has found it unnecessary to make any determination. 5 However, when the question as to the proper application of
Section 4 5 7 -A was last presented to the court,"8 while it did not pass
upon the validity of the statute, because Section 4 5 7-A was not
directly involved, and because "when the jury had rendered its
verdict, the court could have set the same aside on the ground that it
was against the weight of evidence, in which case there would have
been a new trial, but he could not, in view of the conflict, direct a
verdict as he did", the implication was very plain that a trial court'
might not direct a verdict where there was a conflict in the evidence
as distinguished from a defect in proof.
On the other hand, the Appellate Divisions have taken the rule
quite literally. In effect, they have said-although, in most instances, without determining the precise question, and usually insisting that the question was not involved-that a judge may himself determine what has traditionally been a question of fact for the
jury. Whenever such decisions were prosecuted to the Court of
Appeals, they were affirmed, not by reason of Section 4 5 7 -A, but
35

Matter of Bennett, 238 N. Y. 583, r44 N. E. 9o (1924); State Bank v. Siff,

254 N. Y. 627, 173 N. E. 895 (1930).
36

Greenpoint National Bank v. Gilbert, 237 N. Y. ig, 142 N. E. 338 (1923).
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only on the ground that the evidence was incredible as a matter of
law.37 This standard is "described in Fealey v. Bull," as follows:
"There must be not only some evidence, but the evidence must
be sufficient in its nature to warrant the court in submitting a
cause to the jury. In nearly all the cases where it has been held
that a scintilla of evidence was not sufficient to uphold the
verdict, the proof has been a matter of inference. But the rule
also applies to cases of direct evidence. -The testimony of a
witness may be in such contradiction of matters of common
knowledge, or the laws of nature, as to be incredible as a matter
of law. * * * A witness may be so discredited by his own confession that his uncorroborated testimony is insufficient in law
to justify a verdict. * * * We do not assume to enumerate all
the cases where a verdict or a nonsuit should be properly directed. Where, however, the right to a verdict depends on the
credibility to be accorded witnesses, and the testimony is not
incredible nor insufficient as a matter of law, the question of
fact is for the jury to determine."
It would seem quite evident, from this discussion and its vague and
reluctant definition of the process, that, to determine that evidence is
incredible as a matter of law, is, in itself, a dangerous practice, for it
comes dangerously close to saying that the court thinks the judgment
was right on the weight of the evidence. Certainly, the twilight
zone between incredibility, as a matter of law, and the preponderating weight of the evidence, is so narrow as, for all practical purposes, in many cases, to be indiscernible. It is easy enough to pass
from one to the other quite subconsciously. As in many other fields,
the process is a dangerous one. The tendency would seem to be to
extend its application, in the subconscious effort to avoid a decision as
to the validity and construction of Civil Practice Act, Section 457-A.
Indeed, the recent decision in the Serina case" 9-in which the Appellate Division of the First Department, in squarely deciding that
Section 457-A permitted a court to direct a verdict where it would set
aside a contrary verdict as against the weight of evidence, confused
this principle with the established rule that a court may direct a
verdict "where testimony is contrary to reason or opposed to natural
37Greenpoint case, supra note 36; Matter of Price, 119 Misc. 19, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 842; aff'd 204 App. Div. 252, 197 N. Y. Supp. 778 (ist Dept. 1923); aff'd
236 N. Y. 656, i42 N. E. 323 (1923); White & Sons v. U. S. Food Products Corp.,
203 App. Div. 787, 197 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Ist Dept. 1922); see dissenting opinion
of Finch, J., at p. 791; cf. Klein v. Katz, 2oo App. Div. 473, 475, 193 N. Y. Supp.
98 (ist Dept. 1922), which seems to be to the same effect; Matter of Bennett and
State Bank v. Siff, supra note 35.
38I63 N. Y. 297, 57 N. E.631 (1900).
39
Serina v. New York Railways Co., 238 App. Div. 302, 264 N. Y. Supp. 107
(ist Dept. 1933).
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or physical laws"-well illustrates this process. It shows how an
interpretation repeatedly made by implication-though never expressly formulated-and followed by trial dourts, tends strongly to
foreclose consideration of the validity of the rule itself, with the result
that, when the question does come up for a decision, it is necessarily
influenced by the practice which has become general, and the validity
of the rule assumed, upon a principle theretofore carefully distinguished. It is not unusual for error so to be repeated and so to be
emphasized as to become a part of the fabric of our law. The insidious effect of such error may well be grasped from the following
quotation made in the Serina case, from an opinion of the Court of
Appeals, which was thought to justify a rule that a court might direct
a verdict when it would set aside a contrary verdict as against the
weight of evidence:
"If, in the discretion of the court, a verdict may (sic) be set
aside, the parties are not thereby deprived of a jury trial. It is
only when a verdict for the plaintiff must (sic) be set aside as
unsupported by sufficient evidence that a verdict for 4the defendant should be directed or the complaint dismissed."
Yet, it is quite plain that, when the Court of Appeals said that "if,
in the discretion of the court, a verdict may be set aside, the parties
are not thereby deprived of a jury trial", there was no intention to
state that the court might direct a verdict on discretionary grounds,
which would justify it in setting aside a contrary verdict. On the
contrary, the statement is plainly made that, in such case, there
must be at least a new trial, as is further evidenced by the fact that
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment which had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint in that case.
An examination of the background of Section 4 5 7-A, whether in
extrajudicial sources or in judicial opinion, since its adoption or
prior thereto, will show, very clearly, that it could not have been
intended to constitute a change from the practice as it existed before,
but that it was no more than the formulation of a principle declaratory of the prior practice, i. e., permitting a court to direct a verdict
only in those cases in which it could say that there was no issue to
be tried, and forbidding it.to direct a verdict in any case in which
its attitude was rather of dissatisfaction with the quality of the
evidence than with deficiency or defect in proof, and that the convention, in selecting the phraseology of our Section 4 5 7 -A, committed the not uncommon error41 of tearing a phrase from judicial
4
GGetty v.
4

Roger Williams Silver Co., 221 N. Y. 34, 35, 116 N. E. 381 (1917).
ICf. Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingston City R. R. Co., 154 N. Y. 493, 48
N. E. 900 (1897); Fealey v. Bull, supranote 38.
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opinion, which, out of its context, distorted the effect of the decision and misrepresented the universal law on the subject.
As was said with prophetic vision by Cullen, J., in Fealey v. Bull
(supra): "* * * to excerpt a single sentence from a judicial opinion
and construe and interpret it apart from the context of the opinion
in which it is found, and without regard to the subject matter under
discussion, is not only unreasonable, but at times leads to erroneous
conclusions". 4 a This is the basic indictment of the draftsmanship
of Section 4 5 7 -A.
With mere doctrinaire discussions, we shall not concern ourselves.
The fundamental questions were all presented and considered in
McDonald v. MetropolitanStreet Ry. Co.,42 in which it was pointed out
that there is a vast difference between directing a verdict, where a
court would feel justified in setting aside a contrary verdict, and
merely setting it aside and ordering a new trial, because, in the
former case, there would be a termination of litigation in disregard
of the right of jury trial, whereas, in the latter, there would follow
a new trial, as an incident of judicial regulation of jury trials. Certainly, prior to the adoption of Section 4 57-A, there was no case in
which there was even the suggestion that the disposition of questions of fact was within the function of-a trial justice. The pendulum
had swung back and forth, upon this issue, prior to the McDonald
case, but the McDonaldcase seemed to settle it, at least, for our time.
Section 4 5 7 -A, as we have it, has long been the rule in the federal
courts and in many of our sister states. - An examination of these
authorities shows that "the circumstances which will authorize the
direction of a verdict have been variously stated, though there is
but little real conflict of authority". 43 Even in courts which prefer
the phraseology that a court may direct a verdict, where it would
set aside a contrary verdict, it is plain that no such thought
could be tolerated in a case presenting contradictory evidence or permitting of different inferences by reasonable people. Thus, all of the
authorities, professing to apply the rule that a court may direct a
verdict where it would set aside a contrary verdict, are perfectly consistent with the rule as formulated in the McDonald case, which, in
turn, rests upon Fealey v. Bull,44 explaining all the cases. So considered, authorities like Dwight v. GermaniaLife InsuranceCo., 45 and the
host of other cases in all jurisdictions, are but applications of the
fundamental principle that any issue of fact must be submitted to
41ap. 401.

"RULING
-

42 176

CASE LAW (1929)

N. Y. 66, 6o N.

E. 282 (i90i).

§75, P. io67.

4363 N. Y. 397, 57 N. E. 631 (igoo).

423o3 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654 (1886).

SUMMARY JUDICIAL POWER
a jury. The old and misconceived "scintilla" rule is all that is exploded by cases of this type. An issue of credibility, though improbabilities and contradictions may furnish a basis for suspicion,
is still exclusively for the jury. If the jury might have discredited
the party, and even though the court, in the exercise of its discretion,
might have set the verdict aside and ordered a new trial, yet, it is
the jury alone which must determine the issues of fact. 4

Where

"conflicting inferences may not unreasonably be drawn, the weight
of evidence" is for the jury. This is entirely consistent with the rule
that "insufficient evidence is, in the eye of the law, no evidence".4b
Only if there is no issue of fact-as thus defined-can it be said that
there is no issue to be submitted to a jury. The cleavage between
cases in which a judge is permitted to direct a verdict, and those
in which he must submit the issue of fact to a jury, is thus seen to
be at that point where the judicial mind can say that there is a defect
in proof, as distinguished from dissatisfaction with the quality of
evidence. The compiler of Abbott's New York Digest46 grasped
this essential difference, when he summarized the effect of all of our
cases, in the statement that "it is proper to direct a verdict for one
party where it would be necessary to set aside a verdict for.the adverse party". So he groups, in one category, both Dwight v. Ger48
mania Life Ins. Co.4 7 and McDonald v. MetropolitanStreet Ry. Co.
The necessity of setting aside a verdict, as we have seen, exists only
when there is no possible issue of fact to be submitted to a jury.
Never does necessity exist, when it is only upon discretionary grounds,
as to the weight of evidence and the quality of proof, that a trial
justice may feel that a new trial should be ordered. So construed,
Section 4 57-A is valid and declaratory of accepted principles, because it does not require a judge to direct a verdict, where he would
set it aside if it came in to the contrary. It merely empowers him
to do so in a proper case: "A judge may direct a verdict when he
would set aside a contrary verdict as against the weight of the evidence". He does not have to. He should not do so except where,
as a matter of law, it is necessary, i. e., where there is a defect in
proof. Any other interpretation would requirehim to direct a verdict
in every case in which he would set aside a contrary verdict. For,
surely, the legal right of a litigant, in a law case, tried to a jury,
would, under no circumstances, rest in discretion. The power so
"aFealey v. Bull, supra note 44.
4bMatter of Case, 214 N. Y. 199, 2o3, io8 N. E. 4o8 (1915); Pollock v. Pollock,
46
71 N. Y. 137, 153 (1877).
CONSOL. ED., Vol. 35, §168.
48
'TSupra note 45.
Supranote 42.
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granted, since it is discretionary, must be exercised within constitutional limits and within sound rules of judicial discretion. Otherwise, both statute and direction based upon it, are utterly invalid.
This is so in every jurisdiction, whatever be the form which the
statement of the rule may take. "The duty devolving upon the
court in reference to directing a verdict upon the evidence may
become, in many cases, one of delicacy and it should be cautiously
49
exercised."
That the substance of the power is the same, whatever be the
angle of approach, is well demonstrated in an opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court", which subscribes to the formula now reflected in Section 4 5 7-A of the Civil Practice Act:
"Upon the motion in this case, the trial judge was asked to
decide whether, conceding the evidence to establish in plaintiff's favor to a reasonable certainty all it tended to establish,
could men of the age of discretion, of ordinary intelligence,
reasonably differ respecting the proper conclusion to draw? Or,
to put it another way, was there room in the evidence for conflicting reasonable inferences? Or, as it has been many times
put by this court, was the evidence so clear and convincing one
way as to leave no room for unbiased and impartial minds to
come to more than one conclusion? Or so clear and conclusive
as not to admit reasonably of any opposing inferences in unbiased and unprejudiced minds? * * *
"It matters little, if at all, which of the foregoing phrasings
is used. They all mean the same thing, though, it is true, one is
liable to be so strongly impressed with one way as to be disposed to criticize or condemn others. That may come from the
stronger conviction respecting manner of stating the principle
than respecting the real logic of the principle itself."
Even in the Federal Courts, where it has long been the rule that
the court may direct a verdict where it would set aside a contrary
verdict, the cases declare that such rule applies only to those cases
where the court must set a verdict aside. These cases were analyzed
in an opinion written by Judge Taft for the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Felton v. Spiro.5 In that case, the trial judge
had refused to set aside a verdict and order a new trial, because he
was of the opinion that a verdict could not be set aside for any purpose unless the record was such that a contrary verdict would have
to be set aside and a judgment directed by the court as a matter of
49
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law. Since a question of fact was presented, although he felt that
the weight of the evidence was against the finding made by the jury,
he denied the motion. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
order and sent the case back with instructions to the court below to
consider the motion as one for a new trial. It pointed out the distinction between setting aside a verdict as against the weight of
evidence and ordering a new trial, on the one hand, and directing
a verdict and thus finally disposing of the case, on the other. The
court said:
"We come, then, to the question whether a federal -court, in
which a jury has rendered a verdict, has the power to set aside a
verdict when, in its opinion, it is contrary to the decided or
overwhelming weight of the evidence, and in the exercise of a
legal discretion may properly do so. Upon this point we have
not the slightest doubt. This court, in Railway Co. v. Lowery,
20 C. C. A. 596, 74 Fed. 463, has already decided it.
In an
elaborate and most carefully considered opinion, Judge Lurton,
speaking for the court, points out the distinction between that
insufficiency in law of evidence to support an issue which will
justify a peremptory instruction by the court, and that insufficiency in fact of evidence, when weighed with opposing evidence, which, while not permitting a peremptory instruction,
will justify a court in setting aside a verdict based on it, and in
sending the parties to another trial before another jury. The
cases in England and in this country are reviewed at length by
Judge Lurton, and the conclusion reached is fully supported by
authority. The result is thus summed up (page 6o9, 2o C. C. A.,
and page 477, 74 Fed.):
'We do not think, therefore, that it is a proper test of whether
the court should direct a verdict, that the court, on weighing the
evidence, would, upon motion, grant a new trial. A judge might,
under some circumstances, grant one new trial and refuse a
second, or grant a second and refuse a third. In passing on
such motions, he is necessarily required to weigh the evidence,
that he may determine whether the verdict was one which might
reasonably have been reached. But, in passing upon a motion to
direct a verdict, his functions are altogether different. In the
latter case, we think he cannot properly undertake to weigh the
evidence. His duty is to take that view of the evidence most
favorable to the party against whom it is moved to direct a
verdict, and from that evidence, and the inferences reasonably
and justifiably to be drawn therefrom, determine whether or not,
under the law, a verdict might be found for the party having the
onus. If not, he should, upon the ground that the evidence is
insufficient in law, direct a verdict against that party.'
See, also, a decision of this court at the present term, announced by Mr. Justice Harlan, in Insurance Co. v. Randolph,
78 Fed. 754.
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It is apparent, from the foregoing, that the view of the learned
judge at the Circuit, expressed in the opinion on the motion for
new trial, that because the court cannot direct a verdict one way
it may not set aside a verdict the other way, as against the
weight of the evidence is erroneous. Indeed, as distinctly pointed
out by Judge Lurton, the mental process in deciding a motion
to direct a verdict is very different from that used in deciding a
motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of evidence.
In the former there is no weighing of plaintiff's evidence with
defendant's. It is only an examination into the sufficiency of
plaintiff's evidence to support a burden, ignoring defendant's
evidence. In the latter, it is always a comparison of opposing

proofs."2
An excellent discussion of the rule will be found in Ross v. Texas &
PacificRailway Co.,53 where the court said:
"* * * If it be true that there was an absence of testimony
connecting the death of plaintiffs' son with the negligence of the
engineer who was at the time operating the engine, correct
practice would have authorized the court to direct a verdict
for the defendant. Under such circumstances, the submission
of a case to the jury would be useless formality. Says the Supreme Court:
'It is the settled law of this court that, where the evidence
given at the trial, with all the inferences that the jury could
justifiably draw from it, is insufficient: to support a verdict for
the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, would be set
aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but
may direct a verdict for the defendant'. 'Randall v. Railroad
Co., xo9 U. S. 482, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Goodlett v. Railroad
Co., 122 U. S. 41X, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1254; Kane v. Railroad, 128
U. S. 94, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. i6.
But it is said by the court in the case of Goodlett v. RailroadCo.,
supra, that
'Where a cause fairly depends upon the effect or weight of
testimony, it is one for the consideration and determination of
the jury, under proper directions as to the principles of law involved.' Railroad Co. v. Stout, i7 Wall. 66i. See, also, Kirkpatrickv. Adams, 2oFed. Rep. 292,293;Daveyv. Insurance Co.,
Id. 494; Railway Co. v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 502.
The right to a trial by jury, in cases of this character, is a constitutional right, and juries should be permitted to exercise their
proper functions without interference on the part of the court.
The court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that
of the jury in reference to questions of fact which it is the peculiar province of the latter to decide, and courts are not called
62Pp. 582-583.

1344 Fed. 44 (W. D. Tex. x89o).
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upon to weigh, to measure, to balance the evidence, or to ascertain how they should have decided if acting as jurors. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 663. 'In no case', says the Supreme
Court, 'is it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the
jury, and compel a compliance on the part of the latter with its
own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and measure
of that justice which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional
tribunal to award'. Barry v. Edmunds, 16 U. S. 565, 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 5oi".54
Similarly, in Texas &' Pacific R. Co. v. Cox, 5 the court said:
"The case should not have been withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion followed, as a matter of law, that no recovery
could be had upon any view which could be properly taken of
the facts the evidence tended to establish." 6
"Our view is strengthened, we think, if we bear in mind the
rule that, on a motion to direct a verdict for defendant, the
plaintiff is entitled to have taken in his behalf the most favorable
view of the evidence and that it7 is not within the province of
the court to weigh the evidence.".
The views thus expressed, have been generally adopted. Indeed,
most courts consider the question presented on a motion for a directed verdict to be the same as the question presented on a motion
to dismiss the complaint, i. e., assuming all the facts to be as testified
to by the party against whom the motion is made, and giving such
party the benefit of all favorable inferences from the testimony on
both sides, had such party made out a primafacie cause of action
and, therefore, presented a question of fact?
* * * the right of a court to direct a verdict is, touching the
condition of the evidence, absolutely the same as the right of
the court to grant a non-suit. It may grant a non-suit only when,
disregarding conflicting evidence and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, herein indulging
in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from that
evidence, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of
sufficient substantiality, to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff
if such a verdict were given. * * * The rule as to directed verdicts
is not that a verdict may be directed whenever the evidence is
such that upon motion the court would grant a new trial. The
court may grant a new trial even when there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict if it believes that the evidence preponderates against the verdict. It is under compulsion to order
a new trial, and may do this of its own motion when the evidence
is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict. This is the meaning
of the language in Estate of Baldwin, (162 Cal. 471), where it is
"PP. 44-45.
5I45 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905 (189i).
5P. 606.
5
Brownv. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 299 Fed. 461, 467 (N. D. Ga. 1915).
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said that a directed verdict 'is proper whenever upon the whole
evidence the judge would be compelled to set a contrary verdict
aside as unsupported by the evidence.' For a detailed and satisto
factory discussion bf this proposition reference may be made
8

the McDonald v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 167 N. Y. 66".6
"* * * in passing upon motions to non-suit and for the direction
of a verdict, the court cannot weigh the evidence, but must take
as true all evidence which supports the view of the party against
whom the motions are made, and must give him the benefit of
all legitimate inferences which are to be drawn therefrom in his

favor."5 9
9

Estate of Casper, 172 Cal. 147, 155 Pac. 631 (1916).
"9 Andre v. Mertens, 88 N. J. L. 626, 627, 96 Atl. 893 (1916). To the same
effect are: Swan v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 52 Miss. 704 (1876); Woods v. Atlantic
Mutual Insurance Co., 50 Mo. 112 (1872); Moore v. First Nat. Bank of Iowa, 30
Old. 623, 626 (1912); Fox v. Campbell, 49 Kan. 331, 336 (x892); Pocatello Security Trust Co. v.'Henry, 35 Idaho 321, 2o6 Pac. 175, 27 A. L. R. 337 (1922);
California Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 279 Pac. 664 (Cal. 1929), 64 A.L.R. 1412
(1929).

Excellent discussions of the problem will be found in two cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Florida. They justify quotation at length. In Anderson v.
Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L. R. A. 1917 E 717, 718,
the court said:
"The considerations and legal principles that guide the judicial discretion
in directing a verdict and in granting a new trial on the evidence are not the
same. * * * In directing a verdict, the court is governed by practically the
same rules that are applicable in demurrers to evidence. A party, in moving
for a directed verdict, admits not only the facts stated in ,the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that
a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence. 6 Enc. P1. & Pr.
The statute enacts that, 'If * * * after all the evidence shall have
692, et s.
***
been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff in any civil case, it be
that no evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully
find a verdict for the plaintiff, the judge may then direct the jury to find a
verdict for the defendant; and if, after all the evidence of all the parties shall
have been submitted, it be apparent to the judge ** * that no sufficient evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could legally find a verdict for
one party, the judge may direct the jury to find a verdict for the opposite
party.' Acts of 1911, chap. 6220.
"Under this statute, unless 'it be apparent to the judge that no sufficient
evidence has been submitted upon which the jury could legally find' for one
party, the court is not authorized to direct a verdict for the opposite party.
The action of the court under the statute should be such as not to invade the
organic 'right of trial by jury'. When the facts are not in dispute, and
the evidence, with all the inferences that a jury may lawfully deduce from it,
does not, as matter of law, have a tendency to establish the cause of action
alleged, the judge may direct a verdict for the defendant. But the court
should never direct a verdict for one party unless the evidence is such that no
view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party
can be sustained under the law. Where there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable men as to the proof of facts from which an ultimate
fact is sought to be established, or where there is room for such differences as
to the inferences which might be drawn from conceded facts, the court should
submit the case to the jury for their finding; as it is their conclusion, in such
cases, that should prevail, and not primarily the views of the judge. In an
action for negligence, where there is any substantial testimony from which
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the jury could find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, a peremptory charge
for the defendant should not be given. A case should not be taken from the
jury by directing a verdict for the defendant on the evidence, unless the conusion follows as a matter of law that no recovery can be lawfully had upon
any view taken of facts that the evidence tends to establish. The credibility
and probative force of conflicting testimony should not be determined on a
motion for a directed verdict. The duty devolving upon the court in reference to directing a verdict on the evidence may become, in many cases, one
of delicacy, and it should be cautiously exercised. ***
"When it is clear that no error was committed by the trial court in directing
a verdict for one of the parties, an appropriate judgment rendered on such
directed verdict will not be disturbed. * * *

"When the evidence adduced as to the material issues in a cause is not conflicting, and the evidence, with all the inferences that a jury may lawfully
deduce from it favorable to the plaintiff, does not afford a sufficient legal
basis for a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial judge may direct a verdict for
the defendant.
"Conflicts in the evidence as to mere immaterial matters will notrequirea
submission of a cause to the jury if on the whole evidence there is a legal
predicate for a verdict for one party only, in which case a verdict for that
party may be directed.
"But it is reversible error to direct a verdict for one party when there is substantial evidence tending to prove the issue upon which the jury could
lawfully find a verdict for the opposite party. * * *
"Where different conclusions may fairly be drawn from the evidence as to
whether an employee-driver of an automobile was acting within the express
or implied authority of the defendant employer at the time his alleged negligence caused the injury complained of, the evidence should be submitted to
the jury under appropriate instructions."

. In Gravett v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, 314-317, 81 So. 476 (I919), the

court said:
"In determining whether error was committed in directing a verdict, due
consideration should be given to the organic right of trial by jury. Otherwise
fundamental principles may be subordinated to procedure or convenience.

***

"The considerations and legal principles that guide the judicial discretion in
directing a verdict and in granting a new trial on the evidence are not the
same.
"In directing a verdict the court is governed practically by the same rules
that are applicable on demurrer to evidence. Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U. S. 116.
"A party in moving for a directed verdict admits not onlythe facts stated
in the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the
adverse Gunn
party v.
that
a jury
might fairly67 and
infer from the evidence.
City
of Jacksonville,
Fla. reasonably
40, 64 South. Rep. 435.
"When the facts are not in dispute, andthe evidence, with all theinferences
that a jury may lawfully deduce from it, does not, as a matter of law, have
a tendency to establish the cause of action alleged, the judge may direct a
verdict for the defendant. But the court should never direct a verdict for one
party unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully
take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law.
Where there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable men as to
the proof or facts from which an ultimate fact is sought to be established, or
where there is room for such differences as to the inferences which might be
drawn from conceded facts, the court should submit the case to the jury for
their finding, as it is their conclusion, in such cases, that should prevail, and
not primarily the views of the judge. * * * A case should not be taken from
the jury by directing a verdict for the defendant on the evidence, unless the
conclusion follows as a matter of law that no recovery can be lawfully had
upon any view taken of facts that the evidence tends to establish. The credibility and probative force of conflicting testimony should not be determined
on a motion for a directed verdict. The duty devolving upon the court in
reference to directing a verdict on the evidence may become, in many cases,
one of delicacy, and it should be cautiously exercised. * * *
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Referring to Pleasantsv. Fant,0 we find the following as a very apt
statement of the rule:
"In the discharge of this duty it is the province of the court,
either before or after the verdict, to decide whether the plaintiff
has given evidence sufficient to support or justify a verdict in his
favor. Not whether on all the evidence the preponderating
weight is in his favor; that is the business of the jury; but conceding to all the evidence offered the greatest probative force
it is fairly entitled to, is
which according to the law of evidence
it sufficient to justify a verdict."61
We reach the same conclusion if we approach from a different
angle and so grasp what may have been intended by the framers of
our statute. As was stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,62 after discussing- the cases in which a verdict might be
directed:
"They are cases where the evidence is insufficient in law to
support a verdict. * * * In such cases, a refusal of the judge to
instruct the jury that the evidence is insufficient is a good ground
of exception. It is not necessary that there should be absolutely no evidence. * * * What this scintillais, needs to be stated
a little more definitely; otherwise, it may be understood to include all cases where, on a motion for a new trial, a verdict would
be set aside, as against the weight of the evidence. It would be
impossible to draw a line theoretically, because evidence in its
very nature varies from the weakest to the strongest by imperceptible degrees. But the practical line of distinction is, that if
the evidence is such that the court would set aside any number
of verdicts rendered upon it, toties quoties, then the case should
be taken from the jury by instructing them to find a verdict for
the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence is such that,
though one or two verdicts rendered upon it would be set aside
on motion, yet a second or third verdict would be suffered to
stand, the cause should not be taken from the jury, but should
be submitted to them under instructions."
This represents the practical rule underlying the entire doctrine
by which a court may direct a verdict where it would set one aside if
"Although a motion for a directed verdict for onepartymay be denied, yet
in the same case if the trial court is of opinion that the verdict does not accord
with the manifest weight of the evidence and the substantial justice of the
cause, a new trial should be granted if motion is duly made.
"While the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict for one
party will make a directed verdict for the other party improper, yet the mere
legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict rendered, will not preclude the trial court from granting a new trial where the verdict does not do
substantial justice in the cause or is against the manifest weight and probative effect of the evidence."
61p. 122.
S89 U. S. II6 (1874).
uDenny v. Williams, 87 Mass. i, 4-5 (1862).
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it came in to the contrary. Nor is it a doctrine unknown to our own
courts. It is applied in our daily experience, when juries repeatedly
find verdicts contrary to what appellate courts have thought should
be the result. An excellent presentation of the subject will be found
in McCann v. New York &' Queens County Railway Co. :3
"There is nothing extraordinary in this case. This court has
merely differed from the jurors on the inferences that should be
legitimately drawn from the evidence. It is significant that in
attempting to pass upon these questions of fact, this court has
not been unanimous. The first time, the verdict was set aside
upon that ground two justices dissented, and the last time one
dissented. It is plain that in the circumstances the trial court
would have no right to non-suit the plaintiff, and that the court
cannot reverse and dismiss the complaint. These issues of fact
must be ultimately decided by the jury. The single question
presented, therefore, is whether this court can or should accomplish indirectly by setting aside the verdict what it could not
accomplish directly, viz., prevent a recovery by the plaintiff.
The statutory law on the subject is meagre. Section 999 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that the justice presiding at a
trial may entertain a motion made upon his minutes to set aside
the verdict upon the ground, among others, that it is 'contrary
to the evidence'. There is, it is true, no express limitation as to
the extent to which the court may exercise this power, but this
authority is to be construed in the light of the settled practice
of the courts. Where the right to a jury trial exists, it is intended
that the verdict of the jury shall be conclusive upon the facts
in the absence of legal error or bias, passion, prejudice or corruption. Verdicts are set aside as against the weight of evidence, and new trials are granted on the theory that the jury
have been influenced by bias, passion, prejudice or corruption.
Juries are sometimes thus influenced; but a case would have to
present exceptional and extraordinary features to justify the inference that three different juries selected at different times,
without any knowledge of the previous history of the case, would
be thus influenced.
"The early decisions were to the effect that where two successive verdicts are the same, the second would not ordinarily
be disturbed on the ground that it was against the weight of
evidence. * * * Sometimes, as in this case, a second verdict has
been set aside as against the weight of evidence, but unless the
circumstances are extraordinary, and the verdict is clearly outrageous, a court is not justified in setting aside a third verdict
upon the same facts. * * *
"While the trial court and the Appellate Division should not
hesitate to set aside a verdict as against the weight of evidence
"z73 App. Div. 305, 76 N. Y. Supp. 684 (Ist Dept. 19o2); see also Ridgeley v.
Taylor & Co., 126 App. Div. 303, i io N. Y. Supp. 665 (2nd Dept. I9O8).

386

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

where the ends of justice appear to require a new trial, yet when
it comes to setting aside on this ground alone three verdicts rendered in an ordinary action possessing no extraordinary features,
the court should hesitate lest it usurp the functions of the jury."4
The principle that an appellate court shall not persistently set
aside what a jury has found, applies afortiorito a trial court which is
tempted to direct a verdict before a jury has even spoken. Procedural revolutions of such a nature undermine the very foundations of
our system of justice. Trial by jury is still the very essence of our
process. Trial by jury becomes a flimsy thing indeed-vanishing
practically into thin air-if judges may direct verdicts in anticipation of what they may rule after the verdict comes in, unless the
power to do so is limited to those cases where there is a defect of
proof, as distinguished from dissatisfaction with the weight of the
evidence.
The lesson to be gathered from a consideration of the authorities
is that, just as, at one time, the courts went too far in requiring submission of cases to a jury, even when there was nothing of reason to
substantiate the cause of the party, so, at a later time, the courts
found it necessary to insist upon the submission of an issue of fact to
the jury, even though the trial justice may have come to a different
conclusion. Either principle has its disadvantages, but, at least, the
latter is consonant with the essence of the right to trial by jury.
A trial requires control by the trial justice. It does not permit substitution of his judgment for that of the jury. Whatever may be
the volume of litigation in our courts; whatever may be the well-intentioned desire to expedite business-the price paid is entirely too
high, when we sacrifice the very essence of due process, as it has come
down to us through generations of experience. If it be true, as stated
by our Court of Appeals, that an appellate court is not in a position
to appraise the value of testimony, merely on a printed record,6 5
then it is also obvious that the power to direct a verdict where a
court can set it aside, invests a trial justice with a function, the exercise of which is not capable of adequate review, and that such a
power, unduly exercised, and too carefully protected by appellate
courts, will lead to abuses which should be avoided. Judicial power,
if it is to be respected, must remain within judicial limits. It transgresses that limit when it disposes of the merits of a cause, instead of
determining merely whether there is a factual issue to be tried. Summary judicial power is the same, whether we measure it on a motion
64

Pp. 3o6-3o8.

",Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, I69 N. . 632 (1930).
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for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment, or to dismiss a complaint during the progress of a trial, or on a motion for
directed verdict. It may summarily determine any issue of law,
where the facts or the reasonable inferences which may be made
therefrom, are not in dispute. It may do no more. No emergency,
no matter how great, justifies a departure from these principles.
Applied to our immediate problem, the conclusion is th'at we
either construe Section 4 57-A in subordination to them-in which
event we give the statute declaratory, but not amendatory effect-or
we declare the statute unconstitutional. True, this requires an interpretation of the statute which seeks its "internal sense". But,
otherwise, we miss its "kernel", and, in such event, better that we
declare it unconstitutional, than that our basic constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, be destroyed in the process of interpretation
which grasps only the "shell". "If the provision of the constitution
is to remain 'inviolate forever' it must not be violated either in form
or spirit"." Thus, only, may we retain our "birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced
around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches
of arbitrary power",e
There is neither solution nor guarantee to be found in phrases,
maxims, or judicial formulae. What is in its essence a question of
fact, remains so, however we characterize it or in whatever "phrasing". However the question is presented-whether before the trial
by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment,
or during the trial by motion to'disniiss or for a directed verdictthe inquiry is always the same: Is there an issue of fact to be determined? If there is, its resolution is reserved for trial, and if that
trial is of right before court and jury, then the issue of fact is for the
jury to determine, to the end that the constitutional right to trial
by jury, may thus remain "inviolate forever".
All of this was written before the decision in Bank of United
States v. Manheim. That decision points the necessity of everconstant vigilance, lest the "shell" be substituted for the "kernel".
For, in that case, the Court of Appeals, because it was not satisfied with the quality of the evidence-contrary to all the authorities discussed in this article-determined the issue of veracity
between witnesses, on a subject'as to which reasonable people
might well differ, as if it were a question of law. It will serve but
little purpose to afford recognition to the correct rule, if, in
"Ridgeley case, supranote 63, at 305.
67
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 350, i8 Sup. Ct. 620 (1898).
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applying it, we substitute the phrase "incredible as a matter of
law" for the formula of the statute, that, "The judge may direct
a verdict when he would set aside a contrary verdict as against
the weight of the evidence". The process-now, apparently, well
on its way-of extending the scope and meaning of the phrase,
"incredible as a matter of law",'is, indeed, insidious. For, unless
promptly checked, it will know no limits short of judicial appraisal of the factual issues involved. When, as in the Bank of
U. S. case, the court declares that testimony, which is not contrary to the laws of nature nor to reason, is incredible as a matter
of law, it does no more than substitute its own judgment of the
facts for that of a jury. A phrase has been permitted to destroy
a constitutional right. In this manner, the substance of the
right to trial by jury is just as effectively destroyed as if Section
457-A were adjudicated to be amendatory, instead of declaratory,
of theretofore existing law. Deprivation of the right to trial by
jury is just as real and just as serious, when it is accomplished by
characterization of an issue of fact as one of law. The doctrine
of incredibility as a matter of law is thus extended to a point never
before recognized as proper, and an issue of veracity converted
into a question of law. If this decision foreshadows the measure
by which the law shall be applied to the facts, then the formula,
"incredibility as a matter of law", seems destined to a very active
and all-embracing future.

